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The Oregonian - March 26, 2006

Mayfield case:
One mistaken clue sets a spy saga in motion

BY MARK LARABEE and ASHBEL S. GREEN

A newly declassified report into the FBI's investigation of Brandon Mayfield offers a rare look inside a fast-paced international terrorism investigation, revealing some of the secret tactics investigators used, the intense pressures they faced and their disagreements.

In its 273 pages, the report by the Justice Department's inspector general reveals that investigators initially worried that Mayfield -- who was wrongly linked by faulty fingerprint analysis to the March 2004 bombings in Madrid, Spain -- could be part of a second wave of U.S. terror attacks.

The report explains how investigators' goal from the beginning was to spy on Mayfield and possibly recruit him as a covert agent. But media leaks in Europe forced their hand.

The FBI bungled its surveillance, the report says, to the degree that the mild-mannered Portland-area lawyer figured out that he was being watched before federal agents were ready to confront him.

"Had Mayfield been a terrorist, the FBI's failure . . . could have had serious national security implications," the report says.

And the report makes clear that without the media leaks, Spanish police eventually would have figured out that the fingerprint belonged to an Algerian terrorist, allowing the FBI to realize its mistake and shut down the Mayfield operation.

Mayfield's secret file would have been forever sealed away in FBI archives without most people ever knowing it existed. Not even Brandon Mayfield.

Fueled by coincidences: Eight days after Islamic terrorists bombed Spanish commuter trains in March 2004, counterterrorism officials at FBI headquarters called field agents in Portland.

A fingerprint on a blue plastic bag filled with detonators found near the bombing site in Madrid belonged to Mayfield. Within hours, investigators were digging into Mayfield's background and by that afternoon had him under 24-hour surveillance.

Initially, Portland's squad of investigators had just a few pieces of information about Mayfield other than the fingerprint. They knew his birthday and Social Security number and that he'd served in the military from 1985 to 1994. Analysts checked FBI databases to see if Mayfield was the subject of any investigations. He wasn't, but a deeper search circumstantially connected Mayfield to "other suspected terrorists."

Court records showed that less than two years earlier, Mayfield had represented Jeffrey Leon Battle in a custody dispute. Battle was a member of the Portland Seven, a group arrested in 2002 for plotting to fight with the Taliban against U.S. soldiers.

This was one of several coincidences that fuelled the investigation's initial sense of urgency.

Investigators learned that Mayfield was a converted Muslim whose wife was an Egyptian naturalized as a U.S. citizen and that he went to a Portland-area mosque where some of the Portland Seven worshipped.

Mayfield had telephone contact with the U.S. director of an international Islamic charity accused of having terrorist connections. And Mayfield advertised in a business directory administered by a man convicted in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

From the first day of the investigation, the government used every tool available to investigate Mayfield.

The FBI issued National Security Letters, which can be used in intelligence cases to obtain a variety of information, including financial records. The letters prohibit the source of the information, such as a bank or credit card company, from disclosing the inquiry.

A federal grand jury issued subpoenas for information about Mayfield. And the government placed Mayfield's name on national watch lists.

The FBI applied to a secret court for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, known as FISA. The FISA court gave FBI agents retroactive authority to listen to Mayfield's conversations and conduct "sneak and peek" searches, a rarely used and controversial tactic that would allow agents to go into Mayfield's office and home and collect information without telling him they were there.

During covert searches of Mayfield's home and office, FBI agents photographed documents and made copies of computer hard drives. They also copied some of Mayfield's client files, requiring the assignment of a "taint agent," to filter documents that were protected by attorney-client privilege.

The FBI searched the trash at Mayfield's office complex looking for information and blue plastic bags like the one found in Madrid.

During a second search of Mayfield's house, the FBI collected 10 DNA samples and six cigarette butts to compare with samples from Madrid.

The report shows that the hasty surveillance was picked up by Mayfield. Suspicious that he was under surveillance, Mayfield tried to catch his pursuers in the act.

FBI agents noticed him pulling into driveways and cul-de-sacs, only to quickly turn around. He would drive into parking lots, sit for a few moments and then pull out. On his way home, he would drive around the block several times and sit in his driveway and watch to see if he was being followed. The FBI also saw Mona Mayfield using binoculars in the parking lot of her husband's office.

Even as Mayfield suspected someone was following him, he continued to go through his daily routines at work and home, leading one agent to say that "if he is guilty -- he is one cool customer."

After entering Mayfield's home a second time, the FBI realized "there were problems with the search." It's unclear how because the details in the report are blacked out by federal authorities. But it's possible that the FBI agents overheard the Mayfields talking about their suspicions.

Mayfield's wife, Mona, would later tell reporters that she saw footprints in the carpeting and that blinds in the home were not in their usual position.

The FBI called off any more sneak and peeks.

Doubts begin: As investigators pored through the material seized during the searches, they were not finding evidence of a link to Spain.

There was no record of Mayfield's travelling there, and the couple's passports had expired.

The agents believed there was a possibility Mayfield had used an alias to travel to Spain. But "given the character and known terrorism ties of several of his associates, it appears possible that someone else in the community is the link between Mayfield and the Madrid bombings," one FBI memo said.

Eventually, investigators began to wonder if Mayfield could have touched the blue bag in the U.S. before it was "transported by a third unknown party to Europe."

If they couldn't find more evidence, the FBI planned to interview Mayfield in June. Until then, they would continue surveillance.

But bigger doubts about Mayfield were brewing in Spain.

Spanish authorities had all along expressed concern about the Mayfield identification. Initially, the Spanish were amazed that an American would be involved an attack in which all the suspects were local Moroccans.

By mid-April 2004, the Spaniards were more doubtful, and they challenged the FBI's fingerprint identification of Mayfield. To their eyes, the FBI's findings were "inconclusive." While the Spaniards saw many points of similarity between the two prints, they discounted Mayfield based on several significant differences.

This became known as the "April 13 Negativo Report."

Looking again, FBI fingerprint examiners saw a "concerning discrepancy," but they theorized that it was due to a blurring by a "second touch" in the corner of what they still insisted was Mayfield's fingerprint. Convinced they were right, FBI examiners agreed to travel to Spain to explain their findings.

Word of the Negativo Report raised red flags among Portland investigators and prosecutors. But FBI officials in Washington reassured them.

"I spoke with the lab this morning and they are absolutely confident that they have a match on the print. -- No doubt about it!!!! -- They will testify in any court you swear them into," said an April 15 e-mail from an FBI counterterrorism supervisor.

About a week later, an FBI examiner flew to Madrid and demonstrated to Spanish officials how the FBI lab made the match. Although the Spaniards still noted significant differences between the two prints, they agreed to take another look.

But a different version of the meeting was transmitted to officials in the United States.

The Madrid legal attache, or legat, the only American at the meeting who spoke Spanish and served as translator, said the Spaniards seemed satisfied with the FBI's presentation. He also said he expected the Spaniards to fully confirm the FBI.

For now, the FBI's "full-court press" on Mayfield continued.

The arrest: On May 4, a Paris-based Los Angeles Times reporter called the FBI legat in Madrid and asked whether two fingerprint experts could disagree over the identification of a single print. Then the reporter asked, "What about this American" whose print was found in connection with the Madrid bombings?

It was the first indication of a leak, but not the last. The next day, a reporter from a Spanish magazine made a similar inquiry.

The news forced investigators to make a decision. Portland FBI chief Robert Jordan didn't want to take any chances, arguing to take Mayfield into custody to prevent him from fleeing the country.

But top anti-terrorism officials in Washington wanted to continue surveillance. One top official said he did not want to lose the opportunity to "recruit" Mayfield and get him to help the FBI thwart a "second wave" of U.S. terror attacks.

After much debate, it was agreed that agents would approach Mayfield for an interview with a material witness warrant "in their pocket," to be used as a last resort.

Preparing for an arrest, the FBI asked Spanish officials for a report confirming that Mayfield's print was found in Madrid. But the Spaniards were still re-examining the prints.

On May 6, U.S. District Judge Robert E. Jones issued a material witness warrant for Mayfield. Three FBI agents drove to Mayfield's office shortly after 9 a.m. hoping to "smooth-talk him and try to get him to cooperate."

Mayfield had other ideas.

"I don't want you in my office," he told them. "I have client files in here. I don't want to talk with you."

Seeing no other choice, the agents arrested and handcuffed him. They again tried to get Mayfield into a discussion. But he told them he wanted a hearing, that he knew Judge Jones and could not believe that Jones would sign such a warrant.

During the ride to the federal courthouse, Mayfield told the agents he wanted a lawyer.

Between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m., FBI agents searched Mayfield's house, office and car, removing documents, computers and other property. Mona Mayfield told agents that she and her husband were not involved in the Madrid bombings or any other terrorist acts.

Mayfield went before Judge Jones that afternoon. He said the fingerprint wasn't his and that if it was, he had no idea how it got to Spain. Jones considered Mayfield a flight risk and ordered him to jail.

Agents soon discovered that Mayfield's home computers had accessed Web sites relating to the Spanish rail system, Spain's largest airline, a Spanish airport and a Spanish terror group known as ETA. They also found Mayfield's pilot training logs from the 1980s and a book chronicling the development of al-Qaida.

While the FBI was adding to its list of damning circumstantial evidence, long-standing doubts in Spain were becoming public.

The Spanish newspaper El Pais reported May 8 that Spanish National Police were "very doubtful" that Mayfield's print matched the one found on the bag.

Mayfield's lawyers sought his release May 17, but the FBI was still calling Mayfield's print a 100 percent match and the judge denied the move.

The release: On May 19, Portland prosecutors learned that the Spaniards had matched the blue-bag prints to an Algerian named Ouhnane Daoud. Daoud was among a group of militants who blew themselves up in April as police were raiding their suburban Madrid apartment.

During a morning hearing, a prosecutor briefed the judge in private about the new information about Daoud. Without elaborating, Jones determined that Mayfield should remain in custody.

On May 20, higher-resolution copies of Daoud's fingerprints reached the FBI lab. A top lab official told a Portland prosecutor that it would take more time to resolve the conflict but that the FBI examiners "see what the Spanish see."

While the FBI fingerprint experts agreed to return to Spain for further discussions, prosecutors in Portland decided the doubts warranted Mayfield's release. The judge granted the request that afternoon, and Mayfield returned to his family.

On May 24, Jordan held a news conference in Portland and apologized to Mayfield.

FBI fingerprint experts eventually retreated, saying the print was of such poor quality that it could not be used. But they also sent officials back to Spain for a third time, and they got their first look at the original print and the bag.

On July 16, the FBI confirmed that the print belonged to Daoud.

http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/news/1143269775155130.xml&coll=7