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July 24, 2006
US Policy Not Helping Lebanon
Ghassan Rubeiz
In solving Saddam Hussein’s problem, the US has destroyed the infrastructure of Iraq and the result is a quagmire. Similarly, in taming Hezbollah, Israel is destroying Lebanon and risking self entrapment. Israel’s plan to “pressure” the Lebanese nation to “deliver” Hezbollah seems to backfire.
On July 12, the Middle East crisis was about Hezbollah’s provocative border incursion. But in thirteen days, the genocidal Israeli reaction has shifted the crisis from a border security issue to a regional conflict.
US Secretary of State was in Beirut on July 23, starting a mission of regional shuttle diplomacy to try to stop hostilities, albeit in risky slow motion. Condoleezza Rice’s top priority is Israel’s border security. She also claims to want to empower the Lebanese government. But while Ms. Rice takes precious time to reach her political goals, the humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating and causing the US to review a simplistic and biased policy. This policy reduces the root cause of the crisis to Hezbollah’s “terrorist nature and its diabolic alliance with Syria and Iran”.
Despite earlier indications from heads of some influential Arab countries that Hezbollah should be disciplined, the current overall sentiments of Arabs are rage over Israel’s fierce retaliation, anger over US support of the Jewish state and sympathy, mixed with admiration, for Hezbollah’s defiance of Zionism.
The US insists that Hezbollah’s militarization should vanish, captured Israeli soldiers must be returned and the Lebanese government must automatically assume defense of all its borders, all three goals guaranteed, before US would arrange a cease fire. Regrettably, the US is unable to acknowledge the realities that undermine the targeted goals.
First, Hezbollah has proven to be more resilient than expected and the Lebanese state looks weaker today than ever. When there is power equilibrium between adversaries and the cost of continuing fighting is high, cease-fire precedes, not follows, political settlement. A cease-fire is supposed to create the lull in which political negotiations can take place.
The second new reality that the US must appreciate is that Hezbollah’s militancy after the civil war is an artifact of Lebanese politics. Shiites compensated for lack of power, privilege and status by maintaining a militia. Militias thrive in environments of social injustice. Placing Lebanese soldiers on the border with Israel will not work without a voluntary and sensitive integration of Hezbollah into reformed Lebanese politics. The idea of installing a multi national force to assist the Lebanese army to assume responsibility of protecting the borders seems to be gaining currency. The US and Israel have already indicated willingness to accept an international force to serve as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon. But an angry Shiite community will re destabilize Lebanon and sabotage the multi national force. Such a force can only function well for a limited time and it is a band aid solution.
The third reality is that the current crisis is of multiple national causes. Syria, a staunch supporter of Hezbollah, wishes to regain its occupied Golan Heights from Israel. Hezbollah serves Syria’s interest and, in return, gets its support. Palestinians, who have bonded with Lebanon’s resistance, struggle to liberate occupied territories. Hamas, in particular, desires to be recognized as a legitimate government. Iran, an ideological partner and financier of Hezbollah, wants normalization with the US and recognition of its new status as a regional power. Israel and the US are locked in a symbiotic and blinding alliance that deprives them of learning how to serve their legitimate long term interests and their image in the region.
All these competing problems and claims can not be solved at once. But it is imperative for the US to focus on urgent Israeli-Lebanese issues first. Next, the US should take the Syrian, Palestinian and Iranian claims seriously.
A cease fire must be declared soon. Cessation of hostilities should be based on four urgent measures: deployment of an international force with a peace enforcement mandate, deployment of Lebanese army on southern borders, exchange of the three captured Israeli soldiers for Arab prisoners (including the recently captured Hamas politicians) in Israel and a promise from Israel to return Shib’a Farms to Lebanon.
For long term action, the cease fire should also stipulate reactivation of a regional peace process that would engage the US and Israel in negotiations with all parties.
This comprehensive and ambitious conference will deal with Shib’a Farm, Hezbollah’s demilitarization and political future, Palestinian statehood, Syria’s Golan Heights, Israel’s security and normalization with Arab world and Iran/US relations.
US tolerance for negotiation with adversaries, both states and militia representatives, is a requirement for peace making. Israel has negotiated with Hezbollah before, the British negotiated with the Irish Republican Army and South African Government negotiated with African National Congress. If adversaries are ignored the conflict will drag and the US will risk losing all forms of cooperation with the Arab and Muslim world in the next ten to twenty years.
Solving Lebanon’s problem is dealing with its divisive domestic power sharing formula and responding to regional issues that directly interfere with Lebanese politics. There is a popular theory in the Arab world that Israel and US policy is aimed at promoting ethnic and sectarian fragmentation within Arab countries. This theory may sound paranoid political thinking, but recent developments in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon do reinforce extra suspicious patterns of thought. Even if Israel did not intend to destroy Lebanon, if the fighting continues for too long, Lebanon, as a functioning state, may be crippled.
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